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554 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
devise that had been destroyed during his incompetency would be
considered adeemed by the testator's intention. 15 This does not
conflict with the holding in the instant case as it is a well settled
rule that there is an ademption when the testator knows and does
nothing to remedy the destruction of an object of a specific devise.1 6
The decision in this case gives a just and well-reasoned result
in the first situation and does nothing to hinder a just result in
the second situation. By applying the foregoing reasoning to similar
cases, the courts can provide an equitable solution to this small
but confused area of the law.
JAMES BAILEY
TORTS-INVASION OF PRIVACY-INFANTS' RIGHT TO A CAUSE
OF ACTION FOR ENTICING PARENT-By invoking the i n v a s io n
of privacy principle,1 the minor plaintiffs alleged that the female
defendant disrupted the family circle by enticing the father to
leave the home. The children claimed they were deprived of their
father's affection, companionship and guidance and subjected to un-
wanted notoriety. The Supreme Court of Ohio, with one justice
dissenting,2 held that this action arose out of the marital contract
in which the spouse was the sole beneficiary. Thus the action could
not be upheld due to a lack of common law precedent or statutory
authorization. Kane v. Quigley, 1 Ohio St. 2d 1, 203 N.E.2d 338
(1964).
Except where prohibited by stdtutes the gist of the action
by a minor seems to be related to the common law concept of
alienation of affection which allows recovery for loss of Consortium
by a spouse.4 Decisions allowing recovery by a minor against a
third person have been based on the theories of ubi jus ibi reme-
dium5 and invasion of privacy. While some state constitutions
15. See, In re Blerstedt's Estate, supra note 1..
16. See e.g., In re Ireland's Estate, 257 N.Y. 155, 177 N.E. 405 (1931) ; In re Brann,
supra note 3.
1. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543 (1949).
2. The dissenting ju.stice believed there was an Injury to the minor plaintiffs and
based recovery upon the OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16, which allows a remedy for a wrong
done to a person.
3. Seven states have abolished the cause of action for alienation of affection by
adopting "Heart Balm Statutes." See: Alabama, Colorado, Indiana, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York and Wyoming. Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire have abolished the
action only for breach of promise to marry. Michigan and Pennsylvania passed the
statute with the exception that It does not apply to suits by a husband or wife against
a defendant who is a parent, brother, sister or person In loco parentis of the plaintiff's
spouse. Illinois repealed the "Heart Balm Statute" because it violated their state con-
stitution which provides a remedy for a wrong done to a person. Heck v. Schupp, 394
Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946).
4. Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 156, 56 A.2d 768 (1947).
5. Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945). See Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill.
App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810 (1947), which based recovery on the state constitution, and
Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281 (W.D. Mich. 1949), which held that If a wrong has
been committed there should be a remedy.
6. Miller v. Monsen, supra note 1.
RECENT CASES 555
provide that there must be a remedy for a wrong, as the dissent
pointed out in the instant case, other courts have interpreted similar
statutes to have a different meaning.7  Some jurisdictions have
disregarded the allegation of "judicial empiricism"8 and found the
common law'to be flexible.9 It appears that courts have used
this subterfuge of flexibility to establish a cause of action for a
minor against the paramour, but this extension is justified by fair-
ness and justice to the injured child. One decision allowing recovery
draws an analogy to intentional interference with a legal relation-
ship causing loss to the injured party.10 At least thirty-one juris-
dictions recognize the right of p r i v a c y," while only four have
expressly denied this right.12  The better reasoning seems to allow
each child a separate cause of action with a joinder of parties
for the trial.'8
Theories advanced in denying recovery by a minor are: (1) the
action cannot be supported under the marriage contract,'14 (2) lack
of statutory authority allowing recovery, coupled with the feeling
that courts should not engage in judicial empiricism,' 5 (3) multi-
plicity of suits,18 (4) flood of litigation,'7  (5) policy considerations 8
and (6) difficulty in measuring damages.19 Two jurisdictions op-
posing recovery have held there is no loss of consortium by the
7. Taylor v. Keefe, supra note 4, circumvented the provision of the state constitution
guaranteeing redress "for injury done" by holding there must be a legal injury, and an
action by a minor against the paramour did not involve a legal injury. Illinois has
placed emphasis on this provision; see Daily v. Parker and Johnson v. Luhman, supra
note 5. Although Massachusetts has a similar provision it expressly denies a minor a
cause of action in this form of action by statute; Nelson v. Richwagen, 326 Mass. 485,
95 N.E.2d 545 (1950). In Wisconsin such a provision applies only where the injury re-
sults from legal infringement in denying a cause of action by a minor; Cf. Scholberg
v. Itnyre, 264 Wis. 211, 58 N.W.2d 698 (1953). North Dakota has a similar provision in
meaning but different in wording which seems to provide a remedy for a wrong. No
attempt has been made, however, to apply it to this form of action. N.D. CONs'r. art. I,
§ 22: "All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands,
goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due process of law, and right and
justice administered without sale, denial or delay.
8. Daily v. Parker, supra note 5: "[I]f no precedents be found, courts can hardly
be advisely called radical if they indulge in lawmaking by decisions, or in a word, engage
in judicial empiricism." Contra, Scholberg v. Itnyre,-supra note 7.
9. Miller v. Monsen, supra note 1; Russick v. Hicks, supra note 5 (any derogation
from the common law must be strictly construed in referring to the "Heart Balm
Statutes," but the court seemed to justify this statement with its flexibility concept by
holding that the "Heart Balm Statute" did not apply to a minor).
10. Miller v. Monsen, supra note 1.
11. PR0ssER, LAw OF TORTs 831, 32 (3rd ed. 1964). These jurisdictions recognizing the
right to be let alone could conceivably follow the doctrine announced in the Minnesota
decision of Miller v. Monsen, supra note 1, and allow a cause of action by a minor for
Interference with the family unit by a paramour.
12. Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955); Henry v.
Cherry, 30 R.I. 13, 73 Atl.'97 (1909) ; Milner v. Red River Valley Pub. Co., 249 S.W.2d
227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) ; Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).
13. See Johnson v. Luhman and Russick v. Hicks, supra note 5; Henson v. Thomas,
231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E.2d 432 (1949).
14. Coulter v. Coulter, 73 Colo. 144, 214 Pac. 400 (1923) ; Morrow v. Yannantuono,
152 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y.S. 912 (1934).
15. Scholberg v. Itnyre, supra note 7.
16. Taylor v. Keefe, supra note 4; Nelson v. Richwagen, supra note 7; Morrow v.
Yannantuono, supra note 14.
17. Morrow v. Yannantuono, supra note 14; Garza v. Garza, 209 S.W.2d 1012 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1948).
18. t has been Inferred that the threat of (publicity Is used to force settlement and
this has been advanced as the underlying reason for the passage of the "Heart Balm
Statutes." It is felt by some that we have a growing trend toward greater sexual free-
dom and should adjust Our laws in accordance with this trend. See Heck v. Schupp, upra
note 3.
19. Taylor v. Keefe, supra note 4; Nelson v. Richwagen, supra note 7.
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minor in the departure of the parent.20 One jurisdiction felt that
if recovery were allowed the family relationship would be com-
mercialized.21
North Dakota is liberal in allowing recovery by a spouse for
alienation of affection, 22 but has not been faced with the question
of an action by a minor against an enticer of his parent. This
writer feels that North Dakota would allow recovery by a minor
under the existing statute 23 or, barring statutory recovery, would
adopt the invasion of privacy principle expressed in Minnesota.2 4
Allowing recovery, either under statute or expansion of the common
law, raises problems sfmilar to those discussed in the instant case.
Although a novel contention, it might be asserted that the minor
is a third party beneficiary under the marital contract and there-
fore subject to recovery for a wrong committed by a paramour.
It is suggested that North Dakota allow each child a cause of action
with a guardian ad litem appointed for minors bringing the action.
The jury should be allowed discretion in awarding compensatory
and punitive damages, placing such award in trust for the child.
A minor's right of action should arise when a paramour entices
the parent to leave the home. The court should carefully scrutinize
this form of action to prevent fraud and collusion, but should not
deny recovery merely because the assessment of damages is bur-
densome or difficult. The action should become moot when the
child reaches legal age or is capable of self-support.
It is this author's opinion that this sociological and legal prob-
lem should be dealt with by the legislature, but in the absence of
legislative action the courts should act to do substantial justice.
BRUCE E. COLEMAN
ZONI 4G-PARTICULAR USES-REGULATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND
ADJACENT TO CITY LIMITs-Plaintiffs purchased a home in a
20. Morrow v. Yannantuono, supra not 14; Garza v. Garza, supra note 17. Contra,
Johnson v. Luhman, supra note 5; Miller v. Monsen, supra note 1. The latter two de-
cisions attacked the previous reasoning as not viewing the changes which have taken
place in viewing the family as a unit. Daily v. Parker, supra note 5, has suggested that
a Parent leaving home is not worth anything because he was virtually valueless prior
to his departure, and that the value of a parent goes to the question of damages.
21. Henson v. Thomas, supra note 13.
22. See Tice v. Mandel, 76 N.W.2d 124 (N.D. 1956) ; Rott v. Goehring, 33 N.D. 413,
157 N.W. 294 (1916).
23. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02-06 (1960) : "The rights of personal relation forbid: 1.
The abduction or enticement of a husband from his wife, or of a parent from his
child; . .. " This statute should 'be considered in conjunction with the N.D. CONST. art. I,
§ 22. North Dakota's statute relating to personal relations is derived from the CAL.
Crv. CODE § 49, which formerly read the same as that now found in North Dakota.
California amended the statute in 1939 so it now reads: "The rights of personal relations
forbid: (a) The abduction or enticement of a child from a parent, or from a guardian
entitled to its custody; . . ." The amendment omitted "or of a parent from his child,"
and a California decision, Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal. App. 2d 454, 190 P.2d 984 (1948), held
that the legislature expressed the necessary intent to deny a cause of action by a minor
for the enticement of a .parent from the home.
24. Miller v. Monsen, supra note 1.
